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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on the problem of preventing illegal copy-
ing of digital assets without jeopardising the right of legiti-
mate licence holders to transfer content between their own
devices, which make up a domain. Our novel idea involves
the use of a domain-specific mobile phone and the mobile
phone network operator to authenticate the domain owner
before devices can join a domain. This binds devices in a do-
main to a single owner, that, in turn, enables the binding of
domain licences to the domain owner. In addition, the way
in which we control domain membership, and the use of the
domain-specific mobile phone that enables a domain owner
to add devices wherever he/she is physically present, ensures
that devices joining the domain are in physical proximity to
the mobile phone, preventing illicit content proliferation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection-copyright protection;
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection-trusted
computing
General Terms
Design, Security
Keywords
DRM, Copyright Protection, Authorised Domain Manage-
ment, 3GPP GAA, Access Control, Trusted Computing
1. INTRODUCTION
Unauthorised reproduction of digital assets is not a new
issue. Concerns about protecting digital assets are raised
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every time reproduction tools such as tape recorders or pho-
tocopiers become available to consumers. In the past, how-
ever, content piracy was limited to distribution via physical
media. The digitisation of information, the development of
telecommunication technologies such as broadband and mo-
bile networks, and the spread of the Internet have led to a
huge rise in digital content piracy, as content can be shared
and transferred instantly with no loss of quality.
1.1 Authorised Domains
Most current DRM systems recognise that consumers have
more than one device, which they would like to use to ac-
cess their content without requiring multiple licences. Many
DRM system providers (see, for example, section 8) have in-
corporated the concept of an authorised domain into their
content protection solutions. Such a domain is a collection
of devices belonging to a single owner, within which digital
assets can be freely moved.
Abbadi [7] analysed the authorised domain concept, and
divided the devices in a domain into two categories: roots
and leaves. The domain root (unique per domain) represents
a licensed content holder. The leaves in a domain receive
content (and means to access the content) from the domain
root. The content piracy problem can then be divided into
two sub-problems. The first is Root Distribution, where the
root of the domain illegally distributes content and any as-
sociated passwords to an unlimited number of users. For
example, the content holder could illegally distribute con-
tent and its associated password to devices outside the do-
main, i.e. devices which are not leaves in this domain. The
second is Leaf Distribution, where an individual leaf in a
domain illegally redistributes content to devices outside the
domain, as if it is the licensed content holder. For example,
after receiving content and any associated passwords/keys,
a leaf device could illegally re-distribute the content and
passwords/keys to user1, which in turn re-distributes them
to user2, and so on (where user1 and user2 are not leaves in
this domain).
A fundamental DRM requirement is to restrict Root Dis-
tribution to legitimate devices owned by the domain owner,
and to completely prevent Leaf Distribution. In addition,
a DRM system should satisfy other requirements as dis-
cussed in [7], such as: Flexible Rights Structure, Ease of
Use, Content Mobility, Performance, Ease of Recovery, and
Interoperability. As discussed below, the scheme proposed
here satisfies all these requirements.
Other Authorised Domains management solutions for DRM
(see, for example, section 8) typically attempt to address
these problems by using a counter to control the number
of devices that can simultaneously access domain content.
However such counter-based mechanisms have significant
security and usability limitations. For example, in many
schemes (see, for example, section 8) devices can abuse the
system by joining and then leaving multiple domains to ille-
gally use their content. Moreover, in many schemes, increas-
ing the domain size limit requires re-initialising and recon-
figuring the domain, and, in some schemes, domains cannot
be expanded. In addition, there is no binding between the
domain key (content protection key) and the domain owner;
i.e. the Leaf Distribution problem arises. Also, all these
solutions have additional problems in addressing other fun-
damental DRM requirements, such as content backup and
recovery, ease of use, performance, etc. These issues are
discussed in section 8.
1.2 Our novel solution
The system proposed here works by creating a domain
that contains all devices belong to a single owner, within
which digital assets can be freely moved. Each domain has
a unique secret key shared by all domain devices that is used
to encrypt all digital content encryption keys in the domain.
The domain-specific key is generated automatically by a mo-
bile phone owned by the domain owner, and is unavailable in
the clear, even to the domain owner. These measures stop
the domain owner from disseminating the domain-specific
key. Consequently, distributing encrypted content to a de-
vice outside the domain will not enable access to the content
unless this device joins the domain to receive the domain-
specific key.
Before the mobile phone transfers the domain-specific key
to devices joining the domain, it authenticates the domain
owner using a shared secret, e.g. a PIN, and the mobile
phone and the mobile network operator are then mutually
authenticated based on the 3rd Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP1) Authentication and Key Agreement protocol. This
mutual authentication establishes session keys shared by the
mobile phone and the mobile network operator. These ses-
sion keys are later fetched by a Network Application Func-
tion, which maintains and manages consumer domains. The
Network Application Function is provided by the mobile net-
work operator using the General Authentication Architec-
ture mechanism. Next, the mobile phone ensures a joining
device is in close proximity to itself to prevent devices join-
ing a domain via the Internet.
If the above procedure succeeds, the mobile phone releases
the domain key to the joining device. The domain key is
then securely stored by the joining device, is not available
in the clear even to the domain owner, and cannot be copied
from this device to other devices. Only the domain-specific
mobile phone can release the domain key to other devices
after authenticating the domain owner. This binds the do-
main key to the domain owner.
In addition, each domain has two associated limits, main-
tained and controlled by the mobile phone network operator,
one to control the number of devices that can simultane-
ously access domain content, and the other to control the
total number of devices that can join a domain. The latter
limit is designed to stop domain owners abusing the system
by allowing multiple devices to join and then leave their
domains.
1http://www.3gpp.org
These measures address both the Root and the Leaf Dis-
tribution problems, as discussed in section 5. However, our
proposed scheme does not stop legitimate controlled content
sharing, and the physical proximity check does not stop le-
gitimate downloading of digital content from a remote lo-
cation, as outlined in section 4.4. In addition, the gen-
eral approach of this scheme could also be useful in various
other applications requiring strong authentication, because
it strongly binds a domain to its owner. Our solution can be
implemented irrespective of device type, and only requires
the user platforms on which content is to be stored and
used, to have functionality that can be trusted to perform
the proposed DRM scheme correctly.
1.3 Why mobile phones?
The main reason for choosing mobile phones as domain
controllers is that mobile phones are personalised, portable
(enabling a domain owner to add devices wherever he/she is
physically present) and ubiquitous. In addition, the existing
mobile network infrastructure enables the authentication of
subscribers, and provides a Network Application Function
service as part of the General Authentication Architecture
that is used to manage consumer domains. The participat-
ing network operators might want to charge for their service;
however, network operator support is only required when
creating a domain and when devices join the domain, and
hence the cost impact of a modest charge should be man-
ageable. The extra costs in implementing the solution could
be covered from the expected reduction in piracy.
1.4 Organisation of the paper
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
3GPP General Authentication Architecture. Sections 3 and
4 describe the proposed solution and the process workflow.
Section 5 discusses controlling domain membership. Section
6 analyses the system security requirements, threats, and
services. Section 7 describes how the platform trust require-
ments underlying the proposed solution can be met using
functionality in the trusted computing group (TCG2) spec-
ifications. Section 8 describes related work, and section 9
provides conclusions.
2. GENERAL AUTHENTICATION ARCHI-
TECTURE
The scheme we propose relies on the mobile network op-
erator supporting the 3GPP General Authentication Archi-
tecture (GAA) [5, 6]. Specifically we use the General Boot-
strapping Architecture mechanism that builds upon the se-
cret key K shared by the UMTS IC Card (UICC) in the
mobile phone and the mobile network operator’s Home Sub-
scriber Server (HSS). The General Bootstrapping Architec-
ture makes use of two network elements, known as the Boot-
strapping Server Function (BSF) and the Network Applica-
tion Function (NAF). Figure 1 summarises the GAA work-
flow.
The Bootstrapping Server Function has an interface with
the Home Subscriber Server and with the Network Applica-
tion Function, and is part of the mobile network operator.
The Bootstrapping Server Function acts as an intermediary
between the mobile phone, the Home Subscriber Server and
the Network Application Function. The mobile phone and
2http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
Figure 1: The General Authentication Architecture
the Bootstrapping Server Function are mutually authenti-
cated using the 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement
(AKA) protocol [5, 20]. This mutual authentication estab-
lishes secure session keys that are later fetched by the Net-
work Application Function from the Bootstrapping Server
Function, and then used to secure communications between
the Network Application Function and the mobile phone.
Communications between the Network Application Func-
tion and the Bootstrapping Server Function, and between
the Bootstrapping Server Function and the Home Subscriber
Server, are beyond the scope of this paper; details can be
found in [5].
The 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement protocol
works as follows. The mobile phone sends an authentica-
tion request to the Bootstrapping Server Function, which
then contacts the Home Subscriber Server and retrieves the
subscriber security settings and an authentication vector
RAND||AUTN||XRES||CK ||IK . This vector is calculated us-
ing the mobile-specific secret key K, a random challenge
RAND, and a set of functions shared by Home Subscriber
Server and the mobile phone. XRES is the “expected re-
sponse”, used later to authenticate the mobile phone, CK
is the session Cipher Key, IK is the session Integrity Key,
and AUTN is equal to SQN⊕AK||AMF||MAC, where SQN
is a sequence number, AK is the Anonymity Key, AMF is
the Authentication Management Field, and MAC is a Mes-
sage Authentication Code for the string SQN||RAND||AMF,
computed using the key K.
Next, the Bootstrapping Server Function forwards AUTN
and the challenge (RAND) to the mobile phone, which uses
its UICC to calculate IK , CK , RES, and AK, and recover
AMF and MAC from AUTN. The UICC then derives SQN
from the calculated AK and the received SQN⊕AK, which
is used to verify the freshness of the received message. The
UICC calculates the MAC, and then compares it with the
MAC recovered from AUTN. If they are equal, then the
mobile phone has successfully checked the validity of the
network. Subsequently, the mobile phone sends an Authen-
tication and Key Agreement Digest, calculated using RES,
to the Bootstrapping Server Function. The Bootstrapping
Server Function recomputes the Digest, using XRES, and
deems the mobile phone authenticated if the recomputed
value equals the received value.
The Bootstrapping Server Function and the mobile phone
use the session keys CK and IK to establish a secure channel
that protects messages exchanged between them, and be-
tween the mobile phone and the Network Application Func-
tion. The secure channel is implemented using a stream
cipher and a MAC function. For further details of these
services see, for example, [3].
3. SYSTEM MODEL
The model for our scheme involves five main types of en-
tity: Domain Devices, Mobile Phones, Mobile Network Op-
erators, Rights Issuers, and Content Distributors.
3.1 Domain Devices
We require that Domain Devices, including the domain-
specific mobile phone, are trusted platforms (TPs). These
are computing platforms with the property that their state
can be remotely tested, and which can be trusted to store
security-sensitive data in ways testable by a remote party.
A Domain Device could be a PC, laptop, PDA, mobile de-
vice, etc. Each Domain Device is assumed to possess a DRM
agent, which must be trusted to perform the DRM scheme
correctly. Each Domain Device can verify that the DRM
agent is running correctly in another device. In addition,
each Domain Device is assumed to possess an asymmetric
encryption key pair. The corresponding private decryption
key is bound to a particular environment configuration state.
We assume that the DRM software agents that are autho-
rised to read data encrypted using this key will not release
the data outside the Domain Device; even the domain owner
should not be able to retrieve these data in clear. The TP
must provide a protected execution environment, in which
applications run in isolation, free from being observed or
compromised by other processes running in the same pro-
tected partition, or by software running in any insecure par-
tition [9].
A TCG compliant platform meets all these requirements;
see, for example, section 7. TCG compliant platforms are
not expensive, and are currently available from a range of
PC manufacturers, including Dell, Fujitsu, HP, Intel and
Toshiba [10].
3.2 Mobile Phones
Our DRM scheme requires that a domain-specific mobile
phone owned by the domain owner, is registered by the mo-
bile network operator and is equipped with a special ap-
plication. We also suppose that the UICC in the phone
is capable of supporting the DRM scheme. The domain-
specific mobile phone should be compatible with the 3GPP
specifications [5], and is responsible for: authenticating the
domain owner using a shared secret, e.g. a PIN, which is
stored securely in the UICC; mutually authenticating itself
with the mobile network operator; creating and maintain-
ing a domain unique secret key KD that is used to encrypt
content encryption keys; and authorising devices to join its
domain by ensuring that they in physical proximity to it-
self, and that their processing environment is trusted. The
key KD is not available in the clear, even to the domain
owner, and only the mobile phone is able to copy this key
to a device joining the domain.
Each mobile phone maintains two sequentially incremented
domain counters, both of which are initially set to one. The
first counter, Ct, represents the total number of devices that
have joined the domain. The second counter, Cp, represents
the number of devices currently present within a domain.
Both counters have domain-specific limits, denoted by Lt
and Lp (for Ct and Cp, respectively). These limits help con-
trol domain membership, and are set and maintained by the
Network Application Function.
For the purposes of our scheme we assume the Network
Application Function provides the following functions: ini-
tialising and maintaining domain-specific limits, i.e. Lt and
Lp, and backup and recovery of the domain-specific secrets,
KD, Cp and Ct. The phone obtains Lt and Lp from the Net-
work Application Function. Both limits can be increased by
the mobile network operator. Consumers could be charged
more for higher maximum values.
3.3 Content Distributor and Rights Issuer
The Content Distributor distributes items of protected
digital content to consumers. Each item of protected content
is encrypted using a content-specific secret key (KT ), which
is stored inside an associated Rights Object (RO), together
with other rules applying to the content. The Rights Issuer
is in charge of issuing the RO. The Domain Device that
renders protected digital content enforces the rules inside
the associated RO.
4. PROCESS WORKFLOW
The workflow of the proposed system is divided into four
main stages: domain establishment, joining devices, exchang-
ing content, and content backup and recovery. Before per-
forming any of these processes, an initialisation procedure
must be performed between the mobile network operator
and the mobile phone. We now describe each of these processes.
4.1 Initialisation procedure
The initialisation of a mobile phone by a mobile network
operator involves the authentication of the phone and the
establishment of a secure session between the phone and the
Network Application Function. Before creating a domain,
or adding or removing devices from a domain, the domain-
specific mobile phone M authenticates the domain owner
by instructing the domain owner to provide a secret key,
e.g. a PIN, shared by the domain owner and M . Once the
domain owner has been authenticated, M and the Boot-
strapping Server Function perform mutual authentication.
As described in section 2, this process establishes session
keys CK and IK , later fetched by the Network Application
Function F from the Bootstrapping Server Function, and
used to secure communications between F and M .
4.2 Domain Establishment
This phase applies when a consumer wishes to create a
domain (and simultaneously add the domain-specific mobile
phone M to the domain). We assume the initialisation pro-
cedure described in section 4.1 has already been performed.
M securely generates the domain-specific secret key KD us-
ing a random number generator, and initialises counters Cp
and Ct to one. M then sends a Create Domain request to
the Network Application Function F , via the pre-established
secure session, to establish a domain. The request has the
form:
(1) M → F : eCK (KD||IMSI)||mIK (eCK (KD||IMSI))
where eCK (Y ) denotes the symmetric encryption of data Y
using key CK , mIK (Y ) denotes a MAC computed on data
Y using key IK , and IMSI is the International Mobile Sub-
scriber Identity that is used to uniquely identify the domain.
When a user changes his/her IMSI, e.g. by changing network
operator, the new network operator obtains the user domain
information from the old network operator.
Next, F verifies the integrity of the received message and
decrypts it, and then initialises the domain, i.e. sets the
domain limits Lp and Lt, securely associates them with KD
and IMSI, and stores them in its protected storage. F then
transfer these limits to M in the following message:
(2) F →M : eCK (Lp||Lt)||mIK (eCK (Lp||Lt)).
M verifies the integrity of the received message and decrypts
it, and then securely associates Lp and Lt with KD, Cp, and
Ct, and securely stores them in its protected storage.
The domain key KD is generated inside the secure envi-
ronment of M , and is then securely stored by M . Given the
assumptions in section 3.1, this means that it is not avail-
able in the clear even to the domain owner, and cannot be
copied between Domain Devices. In addition, it is unique
per-domain, shared amongst all domain devices, and does
not change during the life of the domain. KD is used to
encrypt ROs, each of which contains a content-specific key
KT that is used to encrypt the associated item of content.
4.3 Joining and Leaving Domains
This phase applies when a device joins or leaves a domain;
we assume that the procedures described in sections 4.1 and
4.2 have already been performed. In order for a device J
to join a domain, it must communicate with the domain-
specific mobile phone M , as shown in Figure 2. J first sends
a Join Domain request to M . The request has the form:
(1) J →M : PJ ||SJ ||N1||CertAJ ||SignJ (PJ ||SJ ||N1)
where PJ is the public encryption key of J , SJ is the exe-
cution status of the DRM agent on J (the exact nature of
SJ is implementation-dependent, see, for example, section
7), N1 is a nonce, CertAJ is a certificate signed by the CA
for the public key AJ , where AJ is the signature verifica-
tion key of J , and SignJ(Y ) denotes a signature on data Y
created using the private signing key of J (note that we use
PX , SX , CertAX , AX and SignX(Y ) throughout to denote
the corresponding objects associated with entity X).
Next, M checks that J is in physical proximity to itself,
e.g. by using the Near Field Communication (NFC) protocol
or measuring the Round-Trip Time (RTT) between M and
J , see, for example, [11, 12, 15]. M verifies CertAJ , extracts
AJ , and checks that it has not been revoked, e.g. by querying
an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) service, [19].
Figure 2: DRM system workflow
M then verifies J ’s signature using AJ , and verifies that
the DRM agent is running correctly in J by checking the
value of SJ . How this verification occurs is implementation-
dependent, see, for example, section 7. M then generates a
nonce N2, and sends the following message to J :
(2) M → J : IDJ ||N1||N2||SM ||CertAM ||SignM (IDJ ||N1||N2||SM )
where IDJ is the identifier for J included in CertAJ . Note
that we use IDX throughout to denote the identifier of en-
tity X. J verifies CertAM , extracts AM from CertAM and
verifies that it has not been revoked, e.g. by querying an
OCSP service. J then verifies M ’s signature by using AM ,
verifies IDJ to ensure that it is the intended recipient, and
verifies message freshness by comparing N1 with the value
sent in (1). J then verifies that the DRM agent is running
correctly in M by checking the value of SM . As above, how
this verification occurs is implementation-dependent. J then
sends the following reply to M :
(3) J →M : N2||IDM ||SignJ (N2||IDM )
M verifies J ’s signature, verifies IDM to ensure that it is the
intended recipient, and checks message freshness by compar-
ing N2 with the value sent in (2). Steps 1–3 conform to the
three-pass mutual authentication protocol described in [14].
M temporarily increments the values of both Ct and Cp.
If they are greater than the maximum permitted value (Lt
and Lp, respectively) held by M , the agent running on M
exits with an appropriate error message. M now sends F
the following backup request for the values of Ct, Cp and
PJ :
(4) M → F : eCK (Ct||Cp||PJ ||IMSI)||mIK (eCK (Ct||Cp||PJ ||IMSI))
F verifies the integrity of the received message and decrypts
it, and then securely associates the new values with the do-
main identified by IMSI. Subsequently, F sends an acknowl-
edgment back to M as follows:
(5) F →M : eCK (Result||Ct||Cp)||mIK (eCK (Result||Ct||Cp))
M verifies the integrity of the received message and decrypts
it. M checks message freshness by comparing Cp and Ct
with the values sent in (4). M then checks the value of
Result. If it indicates success, M stores the values of Ct and
Cp in its trusted storage, and sends the key KD to J in the
following message:
(6) M → J : EPJ (KD)||SignM (EPJ (KD))
where EPJ (KD) denotes the asymmetric encryption of KD
using public key PJ , and where we assume that the asym-
metric encryption primitive in use provides non-malleability,
as described in [16]. Note that we use EPX (Y ) throughout
to denote the asymmetric encryption of data Y using public
key PX . When J receives this message, it verifies the sig-
nature, and then decrypts EPJ (KD). The key KD is then
securely stored by J , as described in section 4.2.
In order for a Domain Device to leave a domain, the do-
main owner follows a similar process, except that the phys-
ical proximity check is not required, the Ct value does not
change, and the Cp value is decremented. Before a Domain
Device leaves a domain, M authenticates and attests to the
state of the leaving Domain Device in the same way as de-
scribed above. This is to ensure that the leaving Domain
Device can be trusted to delete KD and the key used to
protect KD from its protected storage. If a Domain Device
is hacked, the domain owner must inform the CA, which will
then include the hacked Domain Device public key in its re-
vocation list. M checks whether the Domain Device public
key has been revoked, e.g. by querying an OCSP service,
before decrementing Cp.
4.4 Exchanging Content
This phase covers the communication process between
Content Distributors/Rights Issuers and Domain Devices,
between devices in the same domain, and between devices
in different domains. A variety of methods could be inte-
grated into the scheme for downloading digital content C
and the associated Rights Object R from a Content Distrib-
utor/Rights Issuer to a Domain Device V ; see, for example,
[21]. Describing these methods is outside the scope of this
paper; however, it generally involves the following steps. V
sends a Get Content message to the Content Distributor to
request C, as identified by id. The request includes pay-
ment details, e.g. credit card details, which are used to pay
for access to C. The Content Distributor and V mutually
authenticate each other, and the Content Distributor attests
to the state of V , as described in section 4.3, steps 1–3. If
these verifications succeed, the Content Distributor securely
generates a content-specific secret key KT , symmetrically
encrypts C using the key KT , and sends a Generate RO
request to the Rights Issuer, as follows:
(1) Content Distributor→ Rights Issuer: PV ||KT ||h(GKT (C))||id
where we assume that a secure session has been pre-established
between the Content Distributor and Rights Issuer, h de-
notes a globally agreed cryptographic hash-function, GKT (C)
denotes the symmetric encryption of C using key KT , and
where we assume that G provides authenticated encryption,
i.e. provides data confidentiality, integrity, and origin au-
thentication, as described in [17]. Note that we use GX(Y )
throughout to denote the symmetric encryption of data Y
using key X. The Rights Issuer generates the Rights Object
R, incorporating the string:
R = (C’s consumption rules ||EPV (KT )||h(GKT (C))||id)
where h(GKT (C)) is used to bind R to the content C. Sub-
sequently, the Rights Issuer sends the following message to
the Content Distributor:
(2) Rights Issuer→ Content Distributor: CertIRI ||R||SignRI(R)
The Content Distributor then sends the following message
to V :
(3) Content Distributor→ V : CertIRI ||R||SignRI(R)||GKT (C)
V verifies that R is bound to C by recomputing h(GKT (C)),
verifies CertIRI , extracts IRI , checks its validity, e.g. by
querying an OCSP service, and then checks the Rights Is-
suer’s signature. Finally, V decrypts KT using its private
decryption key, re-encrypts it using KD, and retains
R||SignV (R)||GKT (C)||GKD (KT ) in its storage.
Transferring content from a source device Vs to a desti-
nation device Vd in the same domain involves the following
steps. In the description below we implicitly assume that
Vd and Vs have a real-time communications link; if such
connectivity is not available, then the same messages can
be exchanged using a portable storage medium, e.g. a USB
memory stick. We also assume that only Vs needs to query
an OCSP service; however, this does not require all domain
devices to be connected to the Internet whist exchanging
content. For example, a domain could contain one or more
devices with Internet access that are used to download con-
tent from a Content Distributor, to access an OCSP service,
and for distributing the downloaded content to other devices
that do not have a real-time communication link. Vd first
sends the following Get Content message to Vs:
(1) Vd → Vs: CertIVd ||PVd ||id|| SignVd (PVd ||id)
Vs verifies CertIVd , extracts IVd , checks its validity, e.g. by
querying an OCSP service, and then checks Vd’s signature.
If the verifications succeed, Vs sends C, as identified by id,
and the associated Rights Object, in the following message:
(2) Vs → Vd: GKT (C)||EPVd (R||GKD (KT ))
Vd now decrypts EPVd (R||GKD (KT )) using its private key,
and verifies that C is bound to R, as described above. If the
verification succeeds, Vd retainsGKT (C)||GKD (KT )||R||SignVd(R).
Before using the content, KD is used to decrypt KT , which
can be used to decrypt the content.
The main goal of our scheme is to stop content decryp-
tion keys that are stored inside Rights Objects from being
transferred to devices in different domains. This is achieved,
as described earlier, by encrypting each content-specific key
KT with the domain-specific key KD. As explained in sec-
tion 4.3, KD and the key used to protect it are removed
from a device when it leaves a domain, which prevents pro-
tected Rights Objects from being used by devices in multiple
domains. However, this does not stop legitimate controlled
content sharing; protected content can move between de-
vices belonging to different domains. A consumer could,
for example, use protected content by contacting the cor-
responding Rights Issuer, and downloading a trial Rights
Object enabling him/her to temporarily use the protected
content. If the consumer is interested, he/she could then
buy a full usage licence, as explained above. This concept
is known as super-distribution , and has been proposed by
OMA [21] as a means of allowing consumers to obtain digi-
tally protected content from anywhere, and to use it with a
restricted licence. This allows consumers to use content for
a limited period, with lower quality, and/or limited features.
When the consumer is happy with the protected content and
decides to get a full licence, only then will he/she need to
download the Rights Object, which is much smaller than the
encrypted content.
4.5 Backup and Recovery Procedure
A DRM solution must be capable of recovering digital
content in the event of system failure. For backup pur-
poses, digital content encrypted using the domain key KD
can be stored in an oﬄine medium, for example, a tape or
CD-ROM. If the domain key KD is lost and cannot be re-
covered, it follows that the domain content on the backup
cannot be decrypted. Thus, backup provisions for KD are
needed. The domain-specific mobile phone M is required to
communicate with the Network Application Function regu-
larly, as described in section 4.3, and backup KD, Ct and
Cp.
If the mobile phone M cannot be recovered, for exam-
ple, because it has been lost or stolen, the domain owner
must inform the mobile network operator. The mobile net-
work operator will blacklist M and disable M ’s UICC, and
then issue a new UICC. The replacement mobile phone will
need to contact the Network Application Function and re-
store the domain settings stored by the Network Application
Function. The Network Application Function then releases
KD, Cp, Ct, Lp and Lt, to the new domain-specific mobile
phone. Subsequently, other devices in the domain that can-
not recover KD must re-join the domain, as described in
section 4.3 (before M increments the values of the domain
counter it checks with the Network Application Function
whether the joining device public key is already a member
of the domain; if so it does not increment the counters).
5. CONTROLLING DOMAIN MEMBERSHIP
The domain-specific mobile phoneM controls domain mem-
bership in the following way.
1. It limits the number of devices that can be in a do-
main, hence limiting the number of devices that can
simultaneously access domain content.
2. It limits the total number of devices that can join a do-
main, which stops domain owners abusing the system
by allowing multiple devices to join and then leave a
domain.
3. It stops piracy using digital media such as the Inter-
net, because, as described in section 3.2, the content
protection key KD is securely stored inside M , is not
available in the clear, and can only be transferred from
M to other devices after their physical proximity has
been checked; i.e. the physical location check, in con-
junction with the use of counters, addresses the Root
Distribution problem.
4. It imposes stringent restrictions on piracy using phys-
ical media. As the content protection key KD is not
available in the clear even to the domain owner, this
prevents the domain owner from transferring this key
to other users. In addition, as described earlier, M
must be used to transfer this key to other devices,
which can only occur after the domain owner has been
authenticated to M , and mutual authentication has
been performed between M and the mobile network
operator; i.e. the scheme prevents Leaf Distribution.
Most other schemes focus primarily on point (1); see, for
example, section 8. Our solution stops illicit content pro-
liferation; the only way a domain owner could transfer the
content protection key to another user’s device is by trans-
ferring the encrypted domain content, the domain-specific
mobile phone M , and the domain owner’s authentication
credential for M , e.g. a PIN. Whilst possible in principle,
such a procedure is unlikely to be attractive to the domain
owner. Such a process would also mean that the other user’s
device would become part of the domain controlled by M ,
which would mean that fewer of the domain owner’s devices
could be added to the domain. Most importantly, devices
which have joined this domain using M would not be able
to re-transfer the domain key (as described above, only M
can transfer this key to other devices).
6. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now consider the security threats, services, and mech-
anisms that apply to the storage, execution and transmission
of KD, Ct, Cp, Lt, Lp, and digital content. In addition, we
address the security threats, services, and mechanisms be-
tween the mobile device and the Network Application Func-
tion; however, we do not address threats to the 3G security
system. Security threats of this type are addressed else-
where; see, for example, [1, 2, 4].
6.1 Security Threats
Security threats related to processing and storing the domain-
specific values KD, Ct, Cp, Lt and Lp in a mobile phone M
are: (1) unauthorised manipulation of the domain-specific
values during use in M ; and (2) unauthorised manipulation
of the domain-specific values whilst stored in M .
Security threats related to processing and storing KD
whilst in transit between a mobile phone M and a join-
ing device J are: (3) unauthorised reading or updating of
KD whilst in transit; (4) M unwittingly sending KD to a
malacious entity; (5) J unwittingly receivingKD from a ma-
liciousM ; and (6) replay of communications betweenM and
J .
Security threats related to transferring content C and
Rights Object R between Domain Devices are: (7) unau-
thorised reading or alteration of C, and unauthorised alter-
ation of R, while in transit; and (8) transfer of C and R to
an unauthorised entity.
Security threats related to storing and executing C and R
in Domain Devices are: (9) unauthorised reading or updat-
ing of C, and unauthorised updating of R, whilst stored in a
Domain Device; and (10) unauthorised reading or updating
of C, and unauthorised updating of R while being accessed
on a Domain Device.
Security threats related to exchanging messages between
between a mobile phone M and the Network Application
Function F are: (11) unknowingly, M communicating with
a malicious entity, or F communicating with a malicious en-
tity; (12) replay of communication between M and F ; and
(13) unauthorised reading or updating of exchanged mes-
sages.
6.2 Security Services and Mechanisms
The security services required to counteract threats 1, 2,
4, 9, and 10 (listed above) can be provided using trusted
platform functionality, as discussed in section 3.1. In sec-
tion 7.2 we illustrate how such trusted platform functionality
can be implemented using a platform confirming to the TCG
specifications. Threats 3, 5–8 and 11–13, are addressed us-
ing standard cryptographic mechanisms. A direct mapping
exists between the threats outlined above and the services
and potential mechanisms outlined below:
1. Confidentiality and integrity of the domain-specific val-
ues during execution on M . Providing this service
requires process isolation techniques, as discussed in
section 3.1.
2. Confidentiality and integrity of the domain-specific val-
ues whilst stored in M . Providing this service requires
protected storage, as discussed in section 3.1.
3. Confidentiality and integrity of KD whilst in transit.
This service is provided by the use of symmetric en-
cryption and a MAC, see section 4.2, or asymmetric
encryption and a digital signature, see section 4.3.
4. Entity authentication of a joining device J to the domain-
specific mobile phone M . The provision of this service
is implementation-dependent, and involves a protocol
exchange between J and M ; see, for example, section
7. It is initiated whenM and J mutually authenticate
each other — see section 4.3. This mutual authenti-
cation attests to the DRM agent execution status, i.e.
SJ , and whether the platform is trusted, as discussed
in section 3.1.
5. KD origin authentication. The joining device J checks
the origin of KD by checking M ’s signature on the
received encrypted value of KD — see section 4.3.
6. Prevention of replay of communications between M
and a device. This is provided by the inclusion of
nonces in messages — see section 4.3.
7. Confidentiality and integrity protection of content C,
and and integrity protection of Rights Object R whilst
in transit. This service is provided by encrypting C
using an authenticated encryption technique, encrypt-
ing KT using asymmetric encryption technique that
provides non-malleability, and signing R; see section
4.4.
8. Entity authentication of the destination device Vd whilst
transferring content C and Rights Object R. The source
device Vs validates Vd’s public key to make sure it has
not been revoked, and then encrypts R and the en-
crypted KT using Vd’s public key — see section 4.4.
Vs does not need to verify whether Vd is trusted, be-
cause the transferred KT is protected using KD, which
is known only by devices in the same domain and is
revealed only in a trusted environment, as discussed in
section 3.1.
9. Confidentiality and integrity of content C, and integrity
of Rights Object R in Domain Devices. The integrity
of R is protected using a digital signature. C is en-
crypted using the secret keyKT that is itself encrypted
using a secret key KD. As described in sections 4.4,
the symmetric encryption technique in use is assumed
to provide authenticated encryption — see section 4.4.
Also, the encryption key KD is bound to the device’s
trusted environment, as discussed in section 3.1.
10. Confidentiality and integrity of content, and integrity
of Rights Object during execution is provided exactly
as discussed in (1) above.
11–13. These threats are counteracted by the use of the secure
session established between M and F , as described in
section 2; mutual authentication between M and F
counteracts threat 11; threat 12 is counteracted by the
inclusion of nonces — see section 4.3; and threat 13 is
counteracted by the use of symmetric encryption and
a MAC — see section 4.2 and 4.3.
7. IMPLEMENTING THE PROTOCOLS US-
ING TCG
In this section we describe how a system conforming to the
TCG specifications [24, 25, 26] can satisfy the requirements
described in section 3.1. In addition we illustrate how the
TCG-based design counteracts the security threats listed in
section 6.1.
7.1 Trusted Platform Requirements
A TCG compliant platform provides the following fea-
tures, which meet the requirements for a TP given in section
3.1.
1. The TP has a hardware component referred to as Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) that is physically and cryp-
tographically bound to the TP. It is a self-contained
processing module with specialist security capabilities
such as random number generation, asymmetric key
generation, digital signing, encryption capabilities, hash-
ing capabilities, an HMAC [18] engine, monotonic coun-
ters, as well as memory, non-volatile memory, power
detection and I/O. Support for platform integrity mea-
surement, recording and reporting is also provided.
The TPM is typically implemented as a processing en-
gine that is separate from the TP’s main processing
environment.
2. An asymmetric encryption Storage Root Key (SRK)
pair is securely associated with each TPM. The SRK
private key is statistically unique, and is created and
stored inside the TPM. The public part of the SRK
acts as the root for encrypting sub-tree key objects
that are used as data or signing key objects. The pri-
vate part of the SRK is used for decrypting sub-tree
objects.
3. A certification authority, the privacy-CA, certifies pub-
lic identity keys. The generated certificate binds an
identity of the TPM to a public key used for the veri-
fication of digital signatures. Domain Devices request
these certificates from the privacy-CA by providing
their platform credentials. These credentials are gener-
ated by the Trusted Platform Module Entity (TPME),
that vouches that a TPM is a genuine TPM, the Plat-
form Entity (PE), that attests to the correct incorpo-
ration of a particular TPM into a platform, and the
Conformance Entity (CE), that attests that the de-
sign of the TPM in that class of platform meets the
TCG specifications, and that the way that the plat-
form incorporates that type of TPM also meets the
TCG specifications. The corresponding private iden-
tity key, that is protected by the TPM, is used as a
signing key for entity authentication.
4. A TPM can generate two types of keys, known as mi-
gratable and non-migratable keys. Migratable keys
can be transmitted to other TPs if authorised by both
a selected trusted authority and the TPM owner. A
non-migratable key is bound to the TP that created it.
Data encrypted under non-migratable keys can leave
the TP if and only if the software agent authorises
the release of the data to other platforms. We assume
that software agents that are authorised to read data
encrypted using non-migratable keys will not release
the data outside the TP boundaries.
5. The TP can perform integrity challenge and response
exchanges with other TPs. One TP can verify the
trustworthiness of the state of another TP by comput-
ing an expected set of trustworthy integrity metrics
and comparing them with the current platform soft-
ware state obtained from the integrity response, which
we referred to as SX in section 4. This enables a TP
to verify that the DRM agent is running correctly on
a remote platform.
6. The TP protects all secret keys required by Domain
Devices by encrypting them using a non-migratable
key, as described in point (4). The TP associates the
current platform software state, which is stored in the
Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs), with the
non-migratable key, and then protects them using the
SRK. Stored secrets are only released after the plat-
form’s PCRs have been compared with the values as-
sociated with the stored key. Reporting, storage, and
retrieval are carried out by the TPM. Therefore, if a
process relies on the use of secrets, it cannot operate
unless it and its software environment are correct. The
system assumes that if the operating system and appli-
cation are as expected, then the integrity and secrecy
of data is subsequently guaranteed.
7.2 Security Services and Mechanisms
This section describes how security requirements 1, 2, 4,
9, and 10, discussed in section 6, can be met using TCG
functionality.
1. Confidentiality and integrity of KD, Ct, Cp, Lp and Lt
during execution. A challenger can verify that a plat-
form is trusted by validating the platform integrity
metrics. The TP measures the integrity of software
executed from platform start-up and stores the result
in the platform’s PCRs; this provides assurance to the
challenger that the expected version of the OS, and of
any other measured software, is running on the plat-
form. The private key that is used to decrypt KD,
Ct, Cp, Lp and Lt will only be released to the DRM
software agent if the PCR values are as expected. The
system assumes that if the OS and the application are
as expected, then the integrity and secrecy of data is
subsequently guaranteed.
2. Confidentiality and integrity of KD, Ct, Cp, Lp and
Lt whilst stored in Domain Devices. The use of asym-
metric encryption provides the confidentiality service.
When stored in a Domain Device, KD, Ct, Cp, Lp
and Lt are encrypted using a non-migratable key that
is bound to the Domain Device TPM, and only re-
leased when the Domain Device integrity metrics are
in a state that matches the values stored with the
key. Integrity is provided by inserting an authorisa-
tion value into the key object (under the assumption
that the method of encryption used has appropriate
properties) that is required in order to reveal the key.
If the encrypted key object has been altered, the de-
crypted authorisation value will not match the stored
authorisation value.
4. Entity authentication of a device J to the domain-
specific mobile phoneM . This service is achieved using
the TCG challenge-response authentication protocol.
This is initiated when M generates a nonce N1 and
sends it as a part of an integrity challenge to J . J ’s
trusted platform agent (TPA) replies with an integrity
response that includes M ’s identity, N1, and J ’s in-
tegrity metrics, i.e. SJ , all signed by J ’s TPM. In ad-
dition, it provides the measured software logs from the
Trusted Platform Measurement Store (TPMS), as well
as certificates for the measured software. The software
measurements and the certificates enable M to verify
the current state of J [9]. M verifies the signature
and checks that the necessary properties hold for the
platform associated with the identity.
9. Confidentiality and integrity of content C and integrity
of Rights Object R in a Domain Device V . R integrity
is protected using a digital signature. C is encrypted
using the secret key KT that is itself encrypted us-
ing the secret key KD. As described in section 4.4,
the symmetric encryption technique in use is assumed
to provide authenticated encryption. The key KD is
protected using a non-migratable key that is bound to
V ’s TPM and access control information. The pro-
tected storage mechanism is used to ensure that the
non-migratable key is only accessed when the device’s
execution environment state matches that associated
with this key.
10. Confidentiality and integrity of C, and integrity of Rights
Object during execution is provided exactly as discussed
in (1) above.
8. RELATED WORK
We now briefly review some of the more widely discussed
schemes for managing an authorised domain for DRM (note
that in the analyses below we focus primarily on how each
scheme implements an authorised domain; more detailed
analyses of these schemes can be found in [7]). There are
other DRM schemes; however, many such schemes do not
address the authorised domain concept, and only focus on
binding a licence to a single device. Such schemes are not
considered here, as they do not address the core theme of
this paper. Nevertheless, such schemes (including some of
the schemes discussed in this section) could be integrated
with the proposed scheme for downloading content from
content distributors to an authorised domain, as outlined
in section 4.4.
The Digital Rights Management in a 3G Mobile Phone
and Beyond scheme [8], has the following main problems.
The domain key is an asymmetric key pair that changes
every time a device joins or leaves the domain, or when a
device is revoked; this step requires the domain owner to
connect all devices to the Internet to retrieve the new key.
In addition, each time the domain key is changed it requires
all licence files to be re-encrypted, each of which holds a
content encryption key. Each Domain Device must there-
fore keep track of all these licence files. This requires extra
administration, in addition to requiring greater storage and
processing costs. This could result in a significant overhead
if the number of items of content is large. There is also no
binding between the domain asymmetric key and the do-
main owner. This means that any device could be added to
the domain, regardless of device ownership, as long as the
device has not been revoked and a domain trusted authority
authorises it. The scheme described in this paper addresses
all these issues.
Other schemes have the same problems, apart from the
scheme of Popescu et al. [22], that does not require domain
content to be re-encrypted whenever a device joins or leaves
a network. Moreover, most schemes fail to address content
and domain key backup and recovery. Finally, other solu-
tions have their own specific problems.
In the OMA-DRM3 system [21], each device must securely
store the domain keys, domain identifiers, and domain ex-
piry times, provided by each Rights Issuer, for each domain
that it joins. Devices require secure storage to store these
keys. In addition, each Rights Issuer must create and man-
age all domains, and control which and how many devices
are included or excluded from each domain. In order for a
device to use the content in a domain, it must join all Rights
Issuers from which the domain owner has downloaded con-
tent. This is because, as above, each Rights Issuer protects
its content within a domain using a domain specific protec-
tion key provided by the Rights Issuer. This is not user
friendly, as it imposes a significant administrative overhead.
The DRM Security Architecture for Home Networks [22]
uses secret keys shared between pairs of devices for authenti-
cation, and a master key shared between each device and the
domain manager. Each device is required to store the list
of shared secret keys and the device master key, which in-
creases the hardware costs. Extending the domain depends
on the ability of all Domain Devices to increase their stor-
age; it also requires the domain to be re-initialised and all
domain content to be re-encrypted. In addition, the system
3http://www.openmobilealliance.org
requires each downloaded digital asset to be associated with
a global device revocation list. This list will grow with time,
and potentially results in a large increase in download time
and size.
The xCP Cluster Protocol [13] encrypts content encryp-
tion keys using a master key, which is changed every time
devices leave or join the home network. This step requires
all devices to be online, which is inconvenient for some de-
vices such as car CD players, MP3 players, etc. In addi-
tion, every time a device is hacked, a new media key block
is released. This is a large data structure that imposes a
significant overhead when moving it between devices and
generating the master key, especially on devices that have
limited capabilities.
The SmartRight system [23] requires the presence of smart
card readers on all devices, and at least two smart cards per
device: one for content access and the other for presentation
functionality. This increases the total cost, especially bear-
ing in mind the smart card maintenance costs. In addition,
in order to increase the domain size, the system has to be
re-initialised with a new domain key. Moreover, if all Ter-
minal cards are lost or fail, then all existing content will be
unusable, and if the Terminal card that most recently joined
the domain is lost or stolen, then no other devices can be
added.
9. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a novel solution for the protection of
proprietary digital content against illegal copying. The basis
of the solution is a means for identifying device ownership
using the 3GPP GAA. This gives consumers the flexibility
to transfer their digital rights to devices they own, and at
the same time ensures content is protected against illegal
copying. Our proposed solution meets most of the require-
ments for a DRM system (see, for example, [7]), in addition
to avoiding problems found in other proposed solutions.
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